An interesting question facing tax authorities is whether a tax audit has a positive impact on future voluntary compliance, i.e., after an audit, will a firm change its filing behavior to report higher tax liabilities than it would without the audit?
Tax professionals have opposing answers to this question. Some say that an audit has a positive impact. They argue that after an audit, especially when an audit results in additional tax liabilities, a firm may think that the tax authorities are closely monitoring its activities and may feel that it will be caught again if it attempts to conceal revenue. For this reason, the firm may report higher sales revenue than it would have otherwise reported had it not been audited. Other tax professionals argue the opposite. They say that after an audit, a firm may think that it is less likely to be selected for re-audit in the future, which may provide the firm with incentives to cheat.
Both arguments have merit and both sides can provide evidence to support their stance based on the examination of individual firms. However, we would like to know the overall audit impact, not the impact on a particular firm. This study tries to answer the question in a more comprehensive way. In this study, one segment of the New York State economy, Food Services and Drinking Places (NAICS 722), is investigated to detect possible behavior shifts after firms are audited. More specifically, alternative approaches are explored to quantify the impact of an audit on reported sales, which we think is the best indicator for voluntary compliance.
In the literature, there are generally two distinctive approaches to studying tax compliance.
The first approach is based on theoretical grounds; and the second is applying laboratory experiments to analyze the behavior shifts in compliance after simulating tax policy and regulation changes.
In the first approach, the bases of theoretical grounds are not uniform among the researches in the literature. One group of studies is based on the classical microeconomic theories where taxpayers are assumed to be rational and follow the rule of utility maximization in making their tax compliance decisions. Their ultimate goal is to maximize their expected utility under uncertainty (For example, see Allingham and Sandmo 1972) . Another group of the studies introduces sociological and psychological factors, such as moral, shame, trust, political power, and game theory, into their theoretical considerations. They hope these factors can explain some compliance phenomena which the simple utility models could not explain. (For example, see Bernasconi 1998 , Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl 2008 , and Kirchler 2007 . Under this approach, a wide range of interesting factors influencing tax compliance, besides audit, is studied. For example, some researchers propose that taxpayer uncertainty has a positive effect on compliance, (Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1992(2) , and Beck and Jung 1989). Another example is the work by Erard and Feinstein (1994) , who build a game-theoretic model of tax compliance which challenges the notion that honest taxpayers do not significantly influence most aspects of tax compliance systems.
The second approach, the laboratory experiment approach, has been gaining popularity.
People adopt this approach because of the scarcity of real field data. In this approach, experiment participants, either students or real taxpayers, are provided specific information regarding audit, amnesty, or other tax policies. Then they are asked to file tax returns (fake or real tax returns). The tax return data are analyzed to reveal their compliance behavior. For example, Alm and McKee (2006) apply experimental methods to examine the individual compliance responses to a "certain" probability of audit, and conclude that the compliance rate rises if an individual knows he will be audited and the rate falls if he knows he will not be audited. Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001) randomly select taxpayers and inform them that their filling will be "closely examined' and found evidence of taxpayers' behavior changes in response to an increased probability of audit, although the responses are not uniform among different groups of taxpayers. Another experimental research by Alm, McKee, and Beck (1990) finds that the effectiveness of an amnesty program depends on the design of the program and the enforcement efforts post the amnesty. Alm, Jackson, and Mckee (1992(1) ) use data from laboratory experiments to estimate the effects on compliance of the major fiscal instruments and conclude that, among others, there is a positive relationship between audit rate and compliance, but they caution about the generalization from the estimates based on the experiments. Another study by Mittone (2006) concludes that early experience of audits in taxpayers' "tax life" is a more effective way to increase compliance than later audits. Yet another experimental research by Kastlunger, Kirchler, Mittone, and Pitters (2009) also suggests that, although the effectiveness of audits and fines cannot be completely confirmed, early audits in taxpayers' "tax life" have a positive impact on compliance.
The studies mentioned above touch many aspects of the taxpayers' compliance behavior; however, none of them deals exclusively with the changes in the voluntary compliance behavior after an audit. This study is different from those in the literature in several ways. First, we built models exclusively for investigating the voluntary compliance behavior shifts after a firm is audited. Second, apart from the theoretical approach and laboratory experiment approach mentioned above, we used the difference-in-differences non-experimental approach in our study, which is a new approach to the topic in the literature. Third, historical population data of a New York State economic sector were used in this study instead of experimental data or randomly selected sample data used in the literature.
The remainder of this paper consists of five sections. The first section discusses data used in this research and the second section discusses modeling methodologies we tried. The third section presents modeling results from two specific approaches: a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for all audit groups (an audit group is defined as aggregate of all firms which were audited in the same year) and a time series cross section (TSCS) regression with the firstorder autoregressive method. The fourth section discusses the dollar amount of the audit impact based on the regression coefficients from the TSCS approach. Finally, the fifth section concludes the paper.
I. Data

A. Audit, Assessment, and Sales Tax Data
The audit, assessment, and sales tax data used in this study are from three data sets maintained by the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance. The first is the sales tax data set comprised of sales tax returns and account information, including taxpayer names, addresses, business descriptions, industrial code, sales revenue, and sales tax. From this file, all taxpayers in the Food Services and Drinking Places (NAICS 722) were selected.
The Food Services and Drinking Places sector was chosen for several reasons. First, the sales of individual firms in this sector are relatively stable and are not seriously influenced by economic cycles as those in many other sectors, such as auto or building material sales, so the model results may be less impacted by economic cycles. Second, the data of a large portion of firms in this sector are available for the whole period from 1998 to 2008, our studying period.
Third, the number of firms audited each year from 2003 to 2008 in this sector is relatively stable and large enough to avoid sampling bias.
There are 6,886 firms from the Food Services and Drinking Places sector included in this study. They are chosen because they were in business and filed sales tax returns for the entire study period.
The second data set is an audit data set. The audit data set contains a history of audits and audit results. The 6,886 firms selected from the sales tax data set were divided into two groups: experimental and control. If a firm experienced an audit during the study period, it was placed in the experimental group. Otherwise, a firm was placed in the control group. The experimental group includes 1,955 firms and the control group includes 4,931 firms. The audit data set also contains the first-contact date, which is the date on which a firm is initially informed that it is facing an audit. This date is used as the audit date to divide the 1,955 experiment firms into six sub-groups, from 2003 audit group to 2008 audit group.
The third data set is an assessment data set. In the case that the first-contact date for a firm is missing from the audit data set, the assessment date specified in the assessment data set will be used as the audit date. The summary of the control group and the six experimental groups is presented in Table One . 
B. Economic Variables
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of audit on voluntary compliance.
Reported sales revenue of firms was chosen as the dependent variable for our models since it is the best indicator of voluntary compliance. The sales revenue is greatly influenced by economic conditions. In a booming economy, for example, the increase in wages may boost retail sale transactions, which means a higher level of sales revenue. 
II. Modeling Methodology
In the modeling process, numerous approaches were tried to determine the relationship between an audit and voluntary compliance. The general form of the models can be written as (E1) where y may be the reported sales or may be some variations, such as difference or growth rate, of the reported sales. is a dummy variable for audit (audit dummy), which is equal to 0 before the audit year and 1 for the audit year. To explore the best model fit, we tried a variety of assumptions about the audit dummy after the audit year. s represent factors other than the audit dummy affecting the sales revenue, such as New York State personal income or total wages.
Like the dependent variable y, Zs may take alternative forms, such as difference or growth rate.
In some cases, Zs were dropped from our trial models. One reason for dropping them is that they are not statistically significant; another reason is that these economic variables may not be relevant in some cases because they are not audit group specific. In these cases, we assume that these variables have the same or similar impact on the audited firms and not-audited firms.
We tried numerous modeling specifications of E1 to improve the quality of the models, including Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for each audit group, OLS regressions for pooled data of all audit groups, and Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) models. In the TSCS modeling trials, alternative estimation methods were tried, including one and two-way effect methods, first-order autoregressive model (Parks method), and the moving average error correction model (Dal Silva method).
III. Modeling Results
In this section, two specific models we tried will be presented. The first is the pooled OLS regression for all audit groups, and the second is the TSCS model with the first-order autoregressive method. They are the best among the models we tried. They are chosen for their parsimonious nature and significant statistics. While the regression results of the two models are similar, we will show that the TSCS model is superior to the pooled OLS model. The dollar amount of the audit impact on the reported sales and sales tax will be presented in Section IV based on the estimated coefficients of the TSCS model.
In both models, the difference in the growth rate of reported sales between each of the audit groups and the non-audit group is used as the dependent variable. There are several advantages to using the growth difference other than the level or growth rate. First, it avoids the stationary controversy in using levels; second, many external factors, such as tax rate changes, can be dropped from the right hand side of the equation since it can be reasonably assumed that they have the same or similar impact on different audit groups; and third, it avoids the need of normalizing the level data to make the data comparable among different audit groups, which would be necessary if we use levels because of the differences in the number of firms and the level of sales among these audit groups.
A. Pooled OLS Model for All Audit Groups
Before the pooled OLS model was tried, we had tried separate OLS regressions for each of the six audit groups. The structural form of the model for Audit Group is:
(E2) where = the difference in sales revenue growth rates between Group (audited in year )
and Group 0 (control group); = audit dummy for Group . It equals to 0 before the audit year and one in the audit year, and decays at a certain rate afterwards.
There are no economic variables on the right hand side of the equation because they are not statistically significant in all cases. The estimation results (not presented in this paper) show that the regression statistics for almost all audit groups is not satisfactory: the adjusted R-square is low, T statistics is not significant, and Durbin Watson is far from the ideal level. Overall, the relationship between the reported sales and audit could not be detected for most of the audit groups.
Another shortcoming of E2 is the very limited number of observations in each regression.
There are only 11 observations (1998 to 2008) available in the data set and one observation is lost when the level is converted to the growth rate. For this, we think a pooled model may be more appropriate. In the pooled model, the observations for all audit groups are stacked together as one data set. In the case that we want to try the lagged dependent or lagged independent variables on the right hand side of the equation, they are specified as extra independent variables since the time series nature of the data has been removed in the pooled model.
Equation E3 is the specification of the pooled model, which is similar to Equation E2, except
that it includes observations of all six audit groups instead of one audit group, and it has one regression instead of six regressions. Therefore, there is only one and one for all audit groups. , the pooled regression has two improvements. First, the degree of freedom increased substantially, from 8 to 58; second, both adjusted R-square and T are higher. It is clear that T statistics for the intercept, , is not significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Also, the Adjusted R-square, 5.26 percent, is still low. However, if considering the fact that y is not the level of sales, nor the growth rate of sales, but the difference in the growth rate between the audit groups and the non-audit group, we would think that the low adjusted R-square may be acceptable.
B. Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) Regression
In addition to the fact that the Adjusted R-square is low in the pooled OLS model presented above, another shortcoming of the model is that it disregards the time series nature of the data, as we mentioned previously. In the remaining part of this section, we will use the time series cross section models to overcome the shortcomings. We tried various TSCS modeling techniques and found that the best is the TSCS first-order autoregressive model (Parks Method) specified below: The statistics shows that the TSCS autoregressive model has significant improvements over the pooled OLS model. First, the R-square increases to 0.4989; Second, the T statistics for the intercept and each of the independent variable is more significant, especially the T statistics for , the parameter we are most interested in. The low p-value for each coefficient indicates that the independent variables are significant contributors to the variation of the dependent variable and should not be dropped from the modeling.
One advantage of the TSCS autoregressive model is that it takes into consideration the influence of the past behavior on the current period. A close examination of the autocorrelation coefficients, s, tells us that a significant portion of past error components for most audit groups do contribute to the error term of the current period.
IV. The Audit Impact
It is interesting that, although the modeling methods are different, the pooled OLS model represented by Equation E3 and the TSCS autoregressive model represented by E4-a and E4-b produce similar coefficients for the audit dummy, 0.0272 and 0.0263, respectively. Since the TSCS autoregressive model is considered superior to the pooled OLS model, in this section we will use the results of the TSCS model to compute the dollar amount of the audit impact on the reported sales and sales tax.
The audit dummy plays an important role in calculating the audit impact on reported sales and sales tax. We choose the audit dummy with a decaying rate of 1/3 for the TSCS model because it gives the best fit. The regression results show that the audit impact is 2.63 percentage points in the audit year for the experimental groups, i.e., the relative growth rate (relative to the growth rate of the control group) of an experimental group is 2.63 percentage points higher than in the case if the experimental group were not audited, and the impact would decay at the rate of 1/3 each year afterwards. The scale of the impact is presented in Table Two Given the fact that y is the difference in the sales growth rate between an audit group and the non-audit group,
where is the sales revenue of an audit group and is the sales revenue of the non-audit group, the change in can only be caused by the change of since the other three items in the righthand side of Equation E5 could not be affected by the current year audit to the audit group. If is going to increase by a certain percentage points, for example, 2.63 percentage points as in the case of our TSCS model suggests, the only way to make it happen is that increases by the amount of .
The dollar amount of the impact for each audit group is calculated in the following three steps. In the first step, a new series of the assumed sales growth rates without audit impact was calculated based on the information in Table Two And finally, the audit impact is obtained by deducting the series of sales without audit impact from the reported sales. The dollar amount of the impact on reported sales and sales tax for all audit groups is presented in Table Three . Table Three shows 
V. Summary and Conclusions
Many modeling approaches were explored in this research to investigate the audit impact on reported sales. Several variations of the sales measure were tried as the dependent variables to determine which one could be better explained by our models. In addition, both the constant and sliding audit dummies with various decay rates were tried to determine how big the scale of the impact is and how long it would last after a firm is audited. This study does find a positive relationship between the audit and the voluntary compliance.
The findings suggest that the audit productivity may be underestimated in many studies in the literature. It reminds us that when considering the productivity of the audit work, besides the direct audit collections, we should also take the audit impact on the voluntary compliance into consideration. For this reason, the finding may provide tax professionals and tax authorities with incentives to strengthen the audit power and to better structure the audit organizations to generate more revenue for the State.
